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In order to benefit from this book the reader will need to be familiar with other 
aspects of Unix and C. This means that is is not recommended for the beginner. 
Whilst not an introduction, it is rather a master class from a we!;-established Unix 
maestro. The reader will benefit from following the progressive development style 
and noting the many practical hints given. 
Steve HILDITCH 
Computer Science Department 
Manchester University 
Oxford Road 
Manchester, United Kingdom 
P. Leith, Formalism in AI and Computer Science (Prentice-Hall, Hemel Hemgstead, 
United Kingdom, 1990), Price X49.95 (hardback), ISBN O-13-325549-2. 
This book proclaims something rotten in the state of computer science: on its 
“search for a holy grail”, computer science has “got its head stuck in a ditch”; “our 
minds are clouded” as regards the aims of the discipline, while we founder in 
“shark-filled seas”. The rotten something is formalism, which Leith defines as 
formality gone awry, an overweening faith that technology or formalism can provide 
solutions to complex problems. Formalism is “rife”, an “epidemic” in the computer 
science community, a “creeping evil”; it is also the thread that runs through the 
book and holds Leith’s arguments together. The book uses the concept of formalism 
to analyse the failures of workers in artificial intelligence and computer science to 
achieve their stated objectives, or even to appreciate what those objectives are. 
Leith’s hope is, by highlighting the symptoms and corollaries of formalism, to help 
pull computer science out of the ditch. 
Three kinds of formalism are distinguished: the foundationalijt, the axiomatic, 
and the technicalist. Foundationalism is characterised by the belief in, and search 
for, absolute notions; an absolute notion of truth, for example, or of mathematical 
existence, which may provide an irrefutable foundation for logic, say, or mathemati- 
cal proof. Axiomatic formalism is less concerned with ontology, more with the 
e of bodies of knowledge: one may think of Peano arithmetic or 
expert systems in this connection. Technicalism refers not just to the introduction 
of new technologies, but generally to the adoption of a technique or method to 
explicate complex situations; the use of formal methods in software production is 
one example. Leith’s concern is not with these tendencies per se, but with their 
pathological manifestations in computer science, cases where formalist approaches 
are applied with little or no consideration of their applicability. 
The grandiose claims of some researchers in the area of expert systems is a good 
example. The claim that knowledge and expertise can be encoded as a set of 
probabilistic inference ruies is presented, very convincingly, as an arrogant strain 
of axiomatic formalism. Moreover, it is argued, the hypothesis that an exnert system 
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will be of practical use frequently rests on ignorance or oversimplification of the 
social context in which the program is to be used. In an informed and informative 
discussion of expert systems in law, Leith suggests not only that the drive towards 
such an axiomatic formalism is inimical to the human and social complexity of 
legal practice, but also that the assumption that the complexity of law can be 
ameliorated and clarified by codifying statue as inferential procedures is not as 
unproblematic as it may seem. 
Formalism is also to be found in the advocation of formal methods as a solution 
to the software crisis: Leith’s argument here is that research into the development 
of formal methods for program derivation or verification cannot succeed. The 
enterprise is, Leith claims, in itself misguided, for formal methods are impractical 
to apply to large programs, and even if a program is proved correct, the proof must 
be suspect, since mathematical proof is a social concept and not at a!1 the sort of 
absolute concept that foundationalists such as Dijkstra claim it to be: 
The lack of certainty in logic.. . -as evidenced by socio-historical 
analysis-means that Dijkstra’s formalist plan is based upon unsound 
underpinnings. (page 179) 
Moreover, the idea that formal methods provide the key to curing the software 
industry’s ills is a case of technicalism based upon an inadequate analysis of the 
process of software production. Major factors in the software crisis, such as bad 
project management, failure to understand the requirements of the client, and the 
difficulty inherent in moving from an informal to a formal specification, all lie far 
beyond the scope of formal methods. The conclusion is drawn that computer science 
can offer no effective solutions unless it abandons its formalist ideologies and 
embarks upon a serious study of the social context in which software is produced 
and used. 
This book addresses important issues, and the concept of formalism goes some 
way to providing a vocabulary with which these issues can be seriously discussed. 
However, Leith is a man with a message-that formalism has a stranglehold on 
computer science---and that message assumes a life of its own. The rooting out of 
formalism becomes something of a witch hunt: concerning the scope of his 
researches, Leith writes: 
Other areas-database design, for example-were so outwith my ken 
that it lNould have been folly to attempt to make use of them. But that 
does not mean that I do not suspect formalism in these fields. Quite the 
contrary. (page 51) 
The impulse to suspect formalism everywhere leads Leith apparently far outwith 
his ken. One Aapter is given over to a discussion of the problems of logic, where 
Leith’s arguments are muddled, shallow, and sometimes trange: on page 61 he asks 
us to note that the logical co’nnectives 
were on the scene long before the first logician put syl!ogism to paper. 
It is wrong for logicians to take a form of reasoning which is essentially 
prelogical, claim it for their own and then tell the rest of us that when 
we use these pre-logical connectives we are being “logical”. 
Leith’s point is that formal logic is so problematic as to “preclude it from being 
useful to computer science” (page 59), a view I find unnecessarily pessimistic and 
not at all convincingly argued. Leith writes that he has 
spoken to pure mathematicians who claim that if those like Dijkstra 
“really understood what a proof was”, they wouldn’t try to prove 
programs correct. (page 175) 
Now this is more like coffee-room gossip than the balanced discussion we should 
expect from a book addressed to an audience of computer scientists. The implication 
that researchers into formal methods have not thought about the formal complexities 
of their subject is patronising and insulting. 
Leith’s message demands of the author that he convey it as forcefully as possible, 
and while he scores many palpable hits, he also tilts at a few windmills: he criticises 
computer science for failing tci produce any useful software, as though it should 
attempt to rival the commercial sector (and among the useful exceptions which 
Leith cursorily dismisses are implementations of programming languages!). 
There is a lack of academic bblance in Leith’s arguments that ultimately detracts 
from the value of his book. We might ask, for example, how we might best go about 
learning from the failures that are so forcefully portrayed. Leith’s only suggestion 
is that we cultivate “the sociological imagination”, a discussion of which is postponed 
until the final four pages of the book, and by which Leith seems to intend nothing 
more precise than a kind of educa’ted scepticism. There is, for example, no discussion 
of where the boundary between ‘formalism and formality lies, nor of what forms 
might be most pertinent to, or ari:$e from, the incorporation of sociological studies 
within rigorous computer science,.nor of the role that formal methods or any other 
part of computer science might play in such an amalgam. Without such discussions, 
the book offers little more than a sharpening of our hindsight. 
It is a great shame that the author /argely fails to provide unbiased and constructive 
discussion of the issues he raises, ‘for the issues are very important and deserve 
academic debate. The overall impression is of a book rushed into print, where it 
would have benefttted much from m,ore mature deliberation. 
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